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F R O M

THE

E D I T O R

his issue of H emisphere looks at a growing demographic and social problem in Latin America: aging
populations and the shortage of services to meet their needs. The feature articles in this issue
address different aspects of the problem.
As health indicators and medical care in the region have improved, more Latin Americans are living to
reach old age. As Marfa Esther Lozano points out in her report on a pneumonia vaccination campaign
in Mexico, lifestyle and demographic changes are bringing Latin America closer to the developed world
in terms of chronic disease rates. Ailments typical of old age and sedentary lifestyles, such as diabetes
and heart failure, are becoming more of a threat than the epidemic infectious diseases that limit longevi
ty in developing countries. The region’s medical infrastructure is racing to meet the health needs of the
elderly.
Improved medical treatment and longevity also take their toll on social services. Elderly people who
survive illnesses but can no longer care for themselves create challenges for their families and other care
givers. Ursula Karsch’s article on long-term care arrangements in Brazil describes how families cope
when changing work patterns and economic circumstances make it difficult to maintain traditional
extended family care networks.
The burden on families sometimes takes tragic expression in violence toward the elderly. Max
Rothman and Burton Dunlop share their research on elder abuse in Miami and the need to raise com
munity awareness of the problem here and elsewhere.
The decades of neoliberal reform in Latin America have also changed the way pension and retirement
systems work. Carmelo Mesa-Lago reviews the different pension models adapted across the region and
their implications for consumers and national economies.
Vida Yovanovich provides a devastating glimpse of the realities behind the statistics on aging with her
photo essay of images from a Mexican old-age home. Her powerful photographs are a personal reflec
tion on the fears of dementia, loss of dignity, physical decay and isolation that haunt many of us as we
face the prospect of growing old.
Finally, Marian Goslinga brings back one of H emisphere’s most popular features, a publications update
of recent titles published on the topic of aging in Latin America.
Also in this issue are reports touching on some of the top issues in the news from Latin America in
recent months. Juan Carlos Gamboa explores the Fujimori phenomenon and its implications for under
standing presidential popularity in Latin America. George Grayson considers the potential benefits and
pitfalls of the Puebla-Panama plan, Mexican President Vicente Fox’s proposal to integrate Central
America and southern Mexico. The economic crisis in Argentina and its political and social costs is the
focus of Robert Harding’s article. Further insight into the region’s financial state is provided by Greg
Cancelada’s review of a new book by Pablo Toral—an FIU graduate student— on the logic behind
Spanish expansion into the Latin American banking sector.
Coming up in the spring, the next issue of H emisphere will feature a collection of articles on
Colombia, a country that dominates the news from Latin America these days with stories of armed con
flict and controversy over the eradication of illegal drug crops. Look for more LACC events and publi
cations focusing on Colombia in the coming months.
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Argentina on the Edge
by Robert C. Harding II
rriving at Argentina’s
Ezeiza International
Airport, one cannot
immediately appreci
ate the depth of the
country’s current economic and
political problems. Along the
Highway to the South, the ultra
modern six-lane expressway from
the airport to Buenos Aires, the
initial perception is one of tran
quility, the landscape broken only
by miles of pampas grass and palm
trees.
Once in Buenos Aires, however,
it quickly becomes apparent that
the “Paris of Latin America” is not
as interested in glamour or com
mercialism as it is in economic
recovery. On streets throughout
the city billboards advertise not the
newest Sony computer or French
perfume, but rather the success of
President de la Rua’s administration
in negotiating a $40 billion eco
nomic bailout package (at a 16%
interest rate) from the International
Monetary Fund. This so-called
blindaje (armor) has temporarily
staved off possible default on the
country’s massive $145 billion for
eign debt, but the situation is far
from resolved. By the mid 1990s,
following a prolonged period of
impressive economic growth (called
“one of the great economic success
es of the century” by former US
Secretary of State Warren
Christopher) and political calm,
many Argentines had begun to feel
relatively confident about their
country’s future. But now, three
years of economic recession have
left Argentines almost neurotic
with worry over the economy.

A

4
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“Latin America is very fond of the word ‘hope.’
We like to be called the ‘continent of hope.’
Candidates call themselves the ‘candidates of
hope.’ This hope is really something like a
promise of heaven, an IOU whose payment is
always being put off. It is put off until the next
legislative campaign, until next year, until the
next century.”
— Pablo Neruda
T he L egacy

of

N e o l ib e r a l is m

The 1990s began with hope for
change. In 1989, Carlos Menem’s
main goal as Argentina’s new presi
dent was to resolve the country’s
economic and political malaises.
After a bloody and, ultimately, eco
nomically disastrous decade of mil
itary rule (1973-1983) and the sub
sequent civilian administration of
Raul Alfonsm (1984-1989),
Argentina was reeling from hyper
inflation of more than 5,000%
annually, military revolts by dis
gruntled veterans of the Dirty War
(.los carapintadas) and general pub
lic apathy about the future.
Through implementation of a strict
neoliberal economic program,
Menem gave up his Peronist tradi
tions and was able to arrest the
country’s economic seizures,
breathing life back into the
Argentine economy. Inflation was
slashed and budget deficits were
reduced.

Menem’s recovery plan consisted
of two main initiatives. The first
was privatization of state-owned
enterprises. Though occurring
amidst widespread, endemic cor
ruption, the privatization program
provided the Argentine government
with a huge influx of cash and rid it
of many ineffective enterprises.
Practically all major state-owned
firms and enterprises were sold off,
including the buses, the phone sys
tem, the national airline and the
Buenos Aires subway system. The
second part of the plan was a mon
etary convertibility system linking
the value of the Argentine peso to
the US dollar. This had two imme
diate effects: It brought a previous
ly unknown stability to a currency
that, like others in Latin America,
had been frequently devalued to
relieve debt, and it bolstered public
confidence because corrupt public
officials, for which Argentina is leg
endary, could no longer manipulate

R

Pulling back from the brink of economic and social
chaos
the exchange rate system. Bank
accounts were frozen and a fresh
round of loans was procured to pay
off old debts. Not surprisingly,
economic growth returned with a
vengeance, rising to an impressive
12% between 1990 and 1995.
Many foreign observers praised
Argentina as a model of economic
reform in Latin America.
A decade later, the costs of this
equilibrium are becoming apparent.
Menem’s successor, Fernando de la
Rua of the Radical Party, took
office amid world financial turmoil
caused, in part, by Russia’s econom
ic problems. Argentina was experi
encing the highest domestic interest
rates in more than three years, and
economic growth had declined by
half. Moreover, the much lauded
fixed exchange rate and reduced
tariffs had spurred large trade
deficits.
The signs of recession are every
where. Though government statis
tics put unemployment at 15%,
this figure is dubious since the offi
cial unemployment rate in 1996
(pre-crisis) was 17%. Most
Argentines scoff at the official fig
ure, recognizing that the actual
number is much higher, perhaps
30%. Underemployment is also
widespread; for an increasing
number, participation in the infor
mal economy is the only thing
standing between survival and des
titution.
A perfect example of the current
dilemma is Buenos Aires’s ubiqui
tous taxis. After privatization, for
mer state workers were given sever
ance payments of approximately
$25,000 each. An astonishing

M im ing fo r m oney in the streets o f the San Telmo district o f Buenos Aires.
Photo by author.
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Reports: Argentina
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number of these freshly fired work
ers took this money and invested in
a taxi to make a living. Today,
about one-fifth of all vehicles in
Buenos Aires are taxis and many
drivers spend their days prowling
the city’s wide avenues and quaint
cafe-lined streets seeking potential
riders. Most come up empty-hand
ed, and their frustration has led to a
dramatic rise in taxi-related rob
beries in which it is the driver rob
bing the passenger rather than vice
versa.
Other warning signs abound.
The city is littered with stores on
whose front windows is forever
emblazoned liquidation and, in the
past year, many businesses have
reduced prices considerably in an
only partly successful attempt to
lure customers back. The unem
ployed protest almost daily in front
of Congress and the Casa Rosada
presidential palace, and participants
report that their numbers are grow
ing.
H em isp here Volume 10

T he S earch

for

E c o n o m ic

S o l u t io n s

On March 3, 2001, in an effort
to kick start the flagging economy,
President de la Rua dismissed his
entire cabinet following the resig
nation of the economics minister
and the vice president. The next
day, Defense Minister Ricardo
Lopez Murphy was named the new
economics minister. But, in a
move that displays the volatile
nature of this crisis, Lopez Murphy
was sacked only two weeks later
and replaced by Domingo Cavallo,
Menem’s former economics minis
ter and the mastermind of the
peso-dollar convertibility plan.
Cavallo has stated that Argentina
will not proceed to full dollariza
tion and is, in fact, talking about
devising a scheme to provide multi
ple convertibility for the peso with
other world currencies, particularly
the euro. Upon taking office, he
obtained broad powers from
Congress enabling him to intro

duce new fiscal initiatives in an
aggressive bid to revitalize the econ
omy, including a tax on financial
transactions and lower tariffs on
capital goods. He successfully
engineered a $29.48 billion swap of
short-term bonds for longer-term
securities, saving a total of $16 bil
lion in debt-service costs and
prompting some analysts to predict
an easing of the crisis.
International financial organiza
tions also praised the move to cut
public-sector salaries and pensions
by 13%, and the IMF approved an
$8 billion loan—$3 billion of
which is dependent on restructur
ing of the public debt.
But the solutions to Argentina’s
problems may be more elusive than
one would expect due to some par
ticular characteristics. If it were a
first-world country, Argentina’s
debt would not be a problem given
that its debt-to-GDP ratio is at
about same level as the United
States’ was eight years ago. But
Argentina occupies a nebulous
middle position among nation
states: It is too poor to be rich and
too rich to be poor.
First and foremost, future devel
opment continues to be hampered
by a lingering reliance on agricul
tural exports. The country is so
dependent upon these exports that
it has even used them to try to sub
sidize its industrial sector (via agri
cultural profits), a self-defeating
strategy. Nonetheless, efforts to
diversify the economy by using
Argentina’s middle development
niche to market basic technologies
to lesser developed countries have
had only limited success, as in the
sale of solar water pumps and
robotics to Iran in the late 1990s.
The legendary beef and wheat of
Argentina’s glory days at the turn of
the twentieth century still domi
nate, but do not promote growth
in the economy.

Reports: Argentina

Argentina benefits from many
natural resources, a highly literate
population, an export-oriented agri
cultural sector and a diversified
industrial base. However, it suffers
from chronic economic turbulence,
which recent policy has exacerbat
ed. Ironically, the current econom
ic instability is partially the result of
previous attempts under Menem to
salvage the economy. The average
Argentine’s salary or pension has
been deflated since mass privatiza
tion left most Argentines in the
ranks of the self-employed or in
private-sector jobs. The looming
danger is the possibility of a com
plete structural downturn.
P o l it ic a l
C

an d

Structural

h allen ges

Argentina’s difficulties owe more
to historical and structural lapses
than merely poor policymaking.
An example of what Guillermo
O’Donnell has called a “delegative
democracy,” Argentina suffers from
an ineffectual and burdensome
policymaking structure. The
Argentine president commands too
much power, enabling him essen
tially to rule by decree. (Menem
issued more than 12,000 decrees
between 1989 and 1993). This not
only overrides the legislature but
also inhibits any sort of meaningful
participatory policymaking with
opposition parties or business and
labor associations. Concentration of
power has resulted in gross mis
takes, given the lack of consultation
with Argentina’s interest groups.
A baffling and inefficient revenue-sharing program between the
provinces and the capital further
complicates this economic muddle.
All tax revenues collected in the
provinces are sent to Buenos Aires
and, in turn, the provinces can take
out huge advances against the
National Treasury, regardless of the
availability of funds. This arrange

ment has created incredibly strong
provincial corporatist systems. In
the outlying poorer provinces, such
as the wine-growing Mendoza
region, most employment is still
with the government, allowing
provincial governors to administer
virtual fiefdoms. In fact, a recent
central government plan to impose a
countrywide hiring freeze until 2005
to address budget deficits raised
howls of opposition from the
provinces, which are themselves
some of the greatest contributors to
the national debt.
These are merely symptoms of a
much worse affliction. Argentina
has become trapped by its own good
intentions to lead Latin America’s
neoliberal march out of the infla
tionary chaos of the 1980s. The lat
est IMF bailout has bought
Argentina some time, but the long
term prognosis is not promising.
The currency convertibility scheme
brought temporary stability, but in
the long term it has hampered the
country’s ability to run its own econ
omy and shape its future.
Argentina’s monetary policy is
effectively being decided by the
United States Federal Reserve, which
does not necessarily take Argentina
into account. Argentina’s ability to
devalue its currency in an economic
crisis, such as the one the country is
experiencing now, has been essential
ly eliminated. Argentine exports are
expensive compared to those of
neighboring countries, especially
Brazil, which can (and does) devalue
its currency. In addition, Argentina’s
fairly strict pro-labor laws put it at a
disadvantage vis-a-vis its Mercosur
partners, which are undercutting
Argentine exports. And now that
hoof-and-mouth disease has been
discovered among Argentina’s valu
able cattle herds, the damage may be
irreparable in the short term.
Lastly, there are ominous signs
that the Argentine people are

expecting long-term economic
instability. All over Buenos Aires
on weekday mornings, customers
line up outside banks to convert
their savings into dollars. One
bank teller described it as the worst
run on accounts he had ever seen.
And the Spanish and Italian con
sulates (countries from which most
Argentines trace their ancestry) are
deluged by applications from chil
dren and grandchildren of immi
grants seeking to reclaim their
European nationality as a safeguard
if things get too bad.
Many local economists are calling
for an end to peso-dollar convert
ibility, even though a switch would
go against the rising tide of dollar
ization in Latin America (in
Ecuador, Panama, and El Salvador
the official currency is the US dol
lar, and in Peru it is de facto).
Proponents argue that historical
evidence strongly supports the the
ory that a country must be able to
devalue its currency to promote
exports, as was done successfully in
Chile (1974-1979) and Mexico
(post-198 5).
To salvage its economy, Argentina
may have to desecrate the altar of
neoliberalism and curtail some of
the free market policies that have
ruled the country for the past
decade. The alternative is not
inviting. Argentina stands at the
edge, looking into the chasm of
deep recession. Unfortunately, the
bottom is nowhere in sight.

R obert C. H arding II is assistant p r o 
fessor o f international relations a n d
Spanish a t Lynchburg College in
Virginia. He is the author o f
M ilitary Foundations o f Panamanian
Politics (Transaction Publishers,
2001). This article is partially based
upon his research d u rin g a M arch
2001 visit to Argentina.
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Puebla-Panama
by George W. Grayson
exican President
Tehuantepec to Panama. Even
Vicente Fox seeks
before the five- to seven-year PPP is
to expand his
completed, Petroleos Mexicanos
country’s role in
(Pemex), Mexico’s petroleum
world affairs. The
monopoly, will open gas stations in
six-foot-five-inch chief executive—
Central America—a move that
known as the Marlboro Man
Guatemalan President Alfonso
because of his imposing height and
Portillo claims will end “abusive
rugged good looks—is vigorously
exploitation” by multinational cor
pursuing a two-year seat on the UN
porations.
Security Council, acting to contain
Fox insists that the economic
US military involvement in
boost from the PPP will uplift
Colombia and shaping the bilateral
indigenous communities, especially
agenda with Washington, especially
those in Mexico’s southern Chiapas
on immigration questions. Another
state. This area is home to the
priority for Fox is the Pueblasmall but noisy Zapatista National
Panama Plan (PPP), a proposed
Liberation Army (EZLN), which
1,000-mile development corridor
launched an uprising on January 1,
that would integrate southeastern
1994. In recent weeks, the skiMexico with Central America,
masked rebels have condemned as a
including Belize and Panama. So
“farce” the indigenous rights provi
far the plan, which is being touted
sions added to Mexico’s
as a boost to historically marginal
Constitution in August 2001. The
ized economic areas and indigenous
Puebla-Panama gambit, Fox says,
communities, has generated as
would enable Mexico to pay “the
much controversy as it has support.
enormous debt” that it owes to the
10 million Indians living in its terri
E c o n o m ic a n d P o l it ic a l G o a ls
tory.
Fox, a former president of CocaGeopolitical goals also underlie
Cola for Mexico and Central
the venture. When Central
America, is an ardent promoter of
Americans speak of their “big broth
the PPP, which some proponents
er” to the north, they are referring
have christened a latter-day
to Mexico, not Uncle Sam. Even as
Marshall Plan. According to the
he presents an increasingly benign
Mexican chief executive, the initia
Mexican image in the region, Fox
tive would create “all the necessary
wants to broaden his nation’s influ
highway, airport and port infra
ence in Central America, where
structure required for develop
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez
ment,” as well as electricity, oil and
is trying to win friends by supplying
gas supplies essential for sustained
discounted oil to the depressed,
growth.
energy-starved area.
Mexico contemplates building
Of course, there is also the
two refineries and a petrochemical
domestic political angle. Southern
complex in the zone, with pipelines
Mexico remains a stronghold of the
linking the oil-endowed Isthmus of
Institutional Revolutionary Party

M
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(PRI), which Fox bounced from
power in mid 2000. Attracting
businesses, spawning jobs and pro
pitiating Indians in this region
could further weaken the PRI,
which governed Mexico for 71
years. Already, the PRI has lost the
governorships of Chiapas and
Yucatan.
S upporters

and

D

etractors

Portillo and other Central
American leaders, whose countries
are beset by poverty, unemployment
and economic woes, have cheered
the PPP like aficionados at a World
Cup soccer match. They have
already championed 16 potential
projects to modernize higher educa
tion, promote technological literacy,
spur tourism, impel industrializa
tion, uplift border areas and aid the
five million Central American
migrants who cross into Mexico
each year.
Fox and the Central American
presidents hope that private
investors and international lending
agencies—spearheaded by the InterAmerican Development Bank
(IDB)—will come up with the lion’s
share of the monies for this multibillion-dollar undertaking. Faced
with a stagnant Mexican economy,
the Fox administration can con
tribute only $15 million to $20 mil
lion annually.
The plan has an important backer
in IDB President Enrique Iglesias,
who coordinates the commission for
the PPP’s financing and promotion.
“The Puebla-Panama Plan can be a
catalytic force to turn into reality
many projects long desired in the
Mesoamerican region,” he has said.

Reports: Mexico and Central America

Regional bonanza or boondogglei
Governors in most of the dozen
affected Mexican states also have
endorsed the program; however, the
three holdouts govern strategically
located states—Chiapas, Oaxaca
and Tabasco—which boast large
Indian populations.
Subcomandante Marcos, the
leader of the Zapatista guerrillas,
has excoriated the PPP as a ploy by
“international capitalists and their
lackey Fox to eradicate the indige
nous culture, exploit the region’s
resources and keep the local popu
lation in servitude.” Although the
EZLN largely engages in guerrilla
theater and propaganda appeals to
the domestic left and foreign
NGOs, it is capable of sabotaging
the road, communications and
energy projects that must pass
through rainforests and rugged,
flood-prone terrain. Strengthening
Marcos’s hand is the opposition
voiced by the smaller, but better
armed and trained, Revolutionary
Army of the People’s Insurgency
(ERPI), which has carried out
strikes in states that lie in the PPP’s
likely route.
In addition, Central America’s
Catholic bishops have blasted the
“neoliberal” plan for focusing on
energy and infrastructure to the
exclusion of human development
and poverty. “Globalization in
Latin America...has widened the
gap between the rich and poor,”
averred Gregorio Rosa Chavez, aux
iliary bishop of San Salvador, who
also highlighted the pernicious
impact of corruption and impunity
in the region.
Meanwhile, energy analysts worry
that Fox’s grandiose design may

precipitate wrongheaded invest
ments by Pemex, long a PRI honey
pot, to which Fox pledged to give a
“businesslike” orientation. The
state enterprise, which generates
37% of the national budget, cannot
produce the volume of petroleum
products required for a country
where demand is rising by 4% per
year. The firm’s director general has
talked about building two new
refineries and petrochemical plants
in the PPP zone. But erecting new
refineries may not be cost effective,
and the idea baffles many econo
mists. “Wouldn’t it make more
sense,” one Pemex watcher asked,
“to take advantage of shuttered
refining capacity in the southeast
ern US and the Caribbean basin
than to spend billions of dollars on
new facilities?”
Of course, labor leaders love the
notion of more refining and petro
chemical activities, regardless of
efficiency. Such undertakings help
avoid layoffs of Pemex’s 137,000
employees, who produce about the
same quantity of hydrocarbons as
Venezuela does with less than half
as many oil workers.
Environmental groups also
denounce the project. They
worry that convoys of heavy trucks,
giant bulldozers and cranes will
devastate the unique biodiversity in
the corridor, where the rainforest is
already being cut at an alarming
rate.
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While lauding the PPP, Mexico’s
private sector has been slow to
match its rhetoric with cash.

Owners of money-losing construc
tion firms, for instance, have urged
the government to barrel ahead
with the megaproject, which they
hope will generate contracts for
their hard-pressed companies.
Despite their eagerness for official
largess, relatively few Mexican
entrepreneurs regard the 65 million
people—more than half of them
dirt poor— in the region as an
attractive market for sophisticated
goods and services.
Although emblematic of Fox’s
penchant for big concepts, the
Puebla-Panama Plan raises more
questions than it answers. In view
of the deep recession afflicting the
region, the Mexican president, his
Central American colleagues and
local governors should move cau
tiously. Without first obtaining rig
orous cost-benefit analyses, they
could squander billions of dollars of
public monies. Their failure to
mobilize grass-roots support for the
PPP—particularly in rebel-infested
Chiapas—could find insurgents
bombing expensive energy facilities,
communications networks and
highways. Such an outcome would
do little to brighten Mexico’s star in
the international firmament.

George W. Grayson teaches govern 
m en t a t the College o f William &
M ary a n d is an ad ju n ct fello w a t the
Center f o r Strategic a n d International
Studies. His fo rth co m in g book,
M exico: the C hanging o f the Guard,
w ill be p u b lish ed by the Foreign
Policy Association.
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The Politics of Hope
by Juan Carlos Gamboa

I

od immediately following his elec
n November 2000, after allega
tion, a president can expect his rat
tions of electoral fraud and the
ings to begin a process of slow
release of videos showing the
decline. This downward trend may
head of his intelligence agency
be interrupted by the successful han
bribing opposition politicians,
Alberto Fujimori resigned as presi dling of specific policy crises, but the
dent of Peru. He tendered his resigerosion of presidential support is
largely inevitable and inexorable.
nation from the safety of a hotel
A second approach correlates the
room in Japan, away from the ire of
rise and fall in presidential approval
the Peruvian population.
with economic indicators, based on
Although many Peruvians today
the argument that the economy is
view Fujimori as the personification
the most important factor affecting
of corruption and deceit, they were
evaluations of presidential perform
once quick to hail him as the savior
ance. Proponents of this theory
of their country. How do we
might disagree over the role of per
account for this change of heart? Is
sonal (“pocketbook”) or national
distaste for corruption and impunity
(“sociotropic”) economic considera
a sufficient explanation? Are current
tions in determining citizens’ politi
theories of presidential popularity
cal preferences, but they share the
useful in explaining the issue? What
assumption that voters are rational
lessons can other leaders draw from
and self-interested actors. From this
Fujimori’s experience? The following
perspective—which can be summa
discussion analyzes Fujimori’s popu
rized in James Carville’s well-known
larity ratings during his first term in
phrase “it’s the economy, stupid”—
office (1990-1995) in an attempt to
presidential ratings rise when eco
answer these questions.
nomic conditions are good and drop
P u b l i c O p in io n a n d t h e
as the economy falters.
P r e s id e n t
A third widely accepted approach
The study of presidential approval
to presidential popularity focuses on
the media’s agenda-setting capabili
ratings is a relatively new phenome
non in transitional democracies, but
ties. From this viewpoint, news cov
it has been pursued in the United
erage determines the topics society
States and Europe for at least four
considers important, affects public
decades. During this time, three
attitudes toward certain issues and
perspectives have come to dominate
defines the areas in which presiden
tial performance is judged.
the field.
According to a first approach, time
Consequently, popular presidents
is the most important factor in deter
should be considered the result of
mining an executive’s approval rat
frequent and favorable news cover
ings. This line of thinking argues
age, while unpopular ones are the
that a president’s successful showing
product of the media’s constant criti
in public opinion polls is only dis
cism.
tantly related to his actual perform
Are any of these perspectives suffi
ance. After a brief honeymoon peri
cient to explain Fujimori’s public
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opinion performance? Not really,
this article contends.
S t a b il it y
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The story of Fujimori’s first term
in office is well-known. He took
power in 1990 amidst a profound
economic and political crisis, which
included violent guerrilla activity
countrywide. After his upset victory
over novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, the
new president took decisive steps to
reform an economy that had nearly
half of Peruvians living in extreme
poverty. Faced with inflation rates of
more than 7000%, he implemented
a shock program that included the
elimination of subsidies, price hikes
for gasoline and public services, a lib
eralized exchange rate, cuts to the
federal bureaucracy, more “flexible”
labor laws, and the creation of a new
agency (SUNAT) to combat tax eva
sion.
The initial result of these measures
was even higher inflation and an ero
sion of public support. But as
Fujimori negotiated with global
lenders to “reinsert” Peru into the
global economy, enthusiasm for his
programs began to increase. It grew
even more after he dismissed
Congress and suspended constitu
tional rule in 1992. Eighty percent
of Peruvians supported the autogolpe,
allowing the president to overcome a
weak start marked by popular dis
trust of his economic program. This
support was solidified with the cap
ture in September 1992 of Abimael
Guzman, the leader of the Shining
Path guerrillas. Once it became evi
dent that Fujimori’s government had
gained formal legitimacy and that
terrorism no longer represented a
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Explaining presidential popularity in Fujimori s
Peru
Fujimori’s case suggests that, rather than being
led by time variables, economic success or posi
tive media coverage, public approval ratings— at
least in transitional democracies— could instead
be guided by the executives capacity to alter
popular expectations of the future via policy
strikes.
major threat to the state, new and
repatriated capital began flowing into
Peru, providing a substantial boost to
the economy.
But while Fujimori’s economic
reforms succeeded in controlling
inflation, promoting investment and
stimulating growth, they had a
strong negative effect on other
important indicators, among them
poverty and employment. During
Fujimori’s first term, the number of
poor people in Peru grew from seven
million to 12 million. By 1995, half
of the country’s population was liv
ing in poverty. Joblessness also
soared; by the end of 1995, only
10% of Peruvians had stable work,
70% were underemployed and 20%
had no job.
Despite these grim statistics, and
regardless of Fujimori’s unapologetically authoritarian style, his populari
ty grew at an impressive pace after
1992 and stayed high until the end
of his first term, as evidenced by his
easy re-election in 1995. In fact,
contrary to what could have been
expected from a time-based explana
tion of presidential popularity,
Fujimori’s approval ratings were sub

stantially higher in 1995 than they
were at the beginning of his adminis
tration.
Moreover, according to surveys
carried out by Apoyo S.A., a respect
ed public opinion firm, the president
was able to draw on the support of
the population as a whole, including
those sectors that most ardently
fought his 1990 candidacy (highincome groups) and those most
affected by his economic policies
(low-income Peruvians). Could this
be an example of “sociotropic” atti
tudes toward the economy outweigh
ing personal, “pocketbook” factors?
Surveys suggest that this is not the
case (see Figure 1). Peruvians sup
ported the president, but continued
to evaluate both their families’ and
the nation’s economic situation as
negative or “average.” Despite the
commonly assumed correlation
between economic conditions and
presidential approval ratings, factors
relating to economic performance are
insufficient to explain Fujimori’s
popularity.
A careful look at news coverage
also calls into question the validity of
media-based explanations of presi

dential popularity in this case. Peru’s
lively news media offered generally
favorable coverage of Fujimori, pre
senting him as an active, hands-on
leader. However, the news items
they featured did not coincide with
the issues that the public cited most
often in polls. Between 1990 and
1995, Peruvians consistently identi
fied the economy and terrorism as
the issues most important to them.
But during the same period,
Peruvian newspapers and magazines
devoted most of their front-page cov
erage to high-profile political events,
such as the closing of Congress and
constitutional referendums. Social
issues also took a back seat to politi
cal coverage, although Peruvians con
sistently ranked poverty and hunger
among the country’s most serious
problems.
In short, privileged coverage of
issues in the media during Fujimori’s
first term in office did not seem to
translate into salience in the public
mind. At most, the media could
have had an indirect influence on
popular perceptions of the president
by presenting his initiatives in a
favorable light. Given the discrepan
cy between news coverage and the
issues the public ranked as most
important, it is reasonable to con
clude that news coverage could not
have had a direct effect on Peruvians’
evaluations of presidential perform
ance.
Once we have discarded time, eco
nomic and media-based theories,
what is left? Close analysis of
Apoyo’s polling data suggests that the
most important factor behind
Fujimori’s appeal was eradication of
the terrorist threat and, especially, the
H em isphere Volume 10
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Figure 1: Comparative Net Approval Ratings (1990-1995):
The President and Economic Policy
80-

------

Economic Policy

------ President

dent’s perceived shortcomings in
other areas, as illustrated in Table 1.
Reducing the terrorist threat was
vital for the transformation of the
national mood, single-handedly
reversing Peruvians’ perception of the
country’s future prospects at a time
when a recession made it difficult to
recognize the benefits of the admin
istration’s economic program.
Indeed, by March 1993, just a few
months after Guzman’s capture and
despite serious doubts about the
country’s economic performance,
Peruvians began to feel optimistic for
the first time in years. This situation
was confirmed in June of that year,
when positive evaluations of the
country’s future surpassed the vital
50% mark.
E x p e c t a t io n s

Figure 2: Comparative Net Approval Ratings (1990-1995):
The President and Anti-Subversive Policy
80-

------

Anti-Subversive Policy

enormous expectations this issue cre
ated among Peruvians (see Figure 2).
After the capture of the Shining
Path leadership in September 1992,
the administration’s antiterrorism
policies earned Fujimori wholeheart
H em isphere Volume 10

------

President

ed support from a population that
had been growing impatient with
economic recession and the lack of a
government social program. This
achievement seems to have been
enough to compensate for the presi

and

D em ocracy

Fujimori’s case suggests that, rather
than being led by time variables, eco
nomic success or positive media cov
erage, public approval ratings—at
least in transitional democracies—
could instead be guided by the exec
utive’s capacity to alter popular
expectations of the future via policy
strikes. Judging from the Peruvian
example, issues such as government
corruption and regard for democratic
procedures may be of little impor
tance to voters.
In light of the astonishing popular
ity he achieved, it is remarkable how
little attention Fujimori paid to dem
ocratic formalities. Equally striking
is the negligible effect this factor had
on public evaluations of his perform
ance. Some of his policies—especial
ly those related to the government’s
antiterrorist strategy—undoubtedly
contributed to political and econom
ic stability in the short term, but
they also implied a de facto milita
rization of Peruvian society. Instead
of moving the country toward a con
solidation of democratic practices,
Fujimori led Peru in a political
regression characterized by blatant
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T a b l e 1 : E v a l u a t io n s

of

F u j i m o r i ’s G o v e r n m e n t

(Source: Apoyo S.A.)

Which has been the most positive aspect of Fujimori’s government in the past year?
DATE

LOW INCOME

MIDDLE INCOME

HIGH INCOME

July 1991

Financial “reinsertion”

Financial “reinsertion”

Financial “reinsertion”

July 1992

Close Congress

SUNAT

Reduce inflation

July 1993

Capture terrorists

Capture terrorists

Capture terrorists

July 1994

Sendero’s defeat

Sendero’s defeat

Sendero’s defeat

Which has been the most negative aspect of Fujimori’s government in the past year?
DATE

LOW INCOME

MIDDLE INCOME

HIGH INCOME

July 1991

“Shock” program

“Shock” program

“Shock” program

July 1992

Inflation not controlled

Lack of social program

Lack of social program

July 1993

Economic recession

Economic recession

Economic recession

July 1994

Lack of social program

Dependence on military

Economic recession

neglect of the law and open disregard
of civilian institutions.
Such a governing style—which
some analysts have come to call “delegative democracy”—concentrates
power in the presidency at the cost
of other established institutions that
play a balancing role, opening the
way to abuses. Perversely, this con
centration of power gives presidents
the ability to conduct effective
actions in economic, political or
social areas bound to increase their
popularity among their citizens.
Through executive decrees and other
forms of vertical governance, the
president can take sole credit for the
expedient and successful handling of
specific problems, producing a phe
nomenon similar to the “rally around
the flag” effect observed during for

eign policy crises in advanced
democracies. Even if carried out by
questionable means, successful policy
strikes, feeding on public frustration,
create hope among the population,
allowing the government to resist
and render ineffective scrutiny by the
media, constitutional experts and
other political actors.
In contrast, in any true representa
tive democracy, one with functional
institutions, the decision-making
process is the product of protracted
negotiations between divergent inter
ests. As a result, government initia
tives in a democratic setting tend to
emerge slowly. This characteristic,
which some might consider a defect,
should actually be interpreted as a
virtue, for it provides society with a
certain degree of protection against

erroneous policies and ensures that
responsibility for mistakes is shared
among various political actors.
Fujimori’s concentration of power
made it possible for him to deliver
speedy solutions (which most
Peruvians gratefully supported) and
take full credit for them. In the
process, however, he debilitated the
country’s institutions and increased
his chances of committing serious
mistakes. Peruvians have had to pay
the price for their willingness to sup
port such a strategy.
Juan Carlos Gamboa is vice president
fo r Latin American p u b lic affairs at
Fleishman-Hillard, an international
com m unications consulting firm . He
has a Ph.D. in political science from
Tulane University.
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Pension “Privatization”
by Carmelo Mesa-Lago
n the last two decades, half
of the countries of Latin
America have undertaken
structural reforms, or “priva
tization,” of their social secu
rity pension systems. This article
discusses how much is true about
this so-called privatization and the
role of the state; in addition, it
examines the impact of the reform
on the insured, as well as its
macro- and microeconomic effects.
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In 1979-1981, Chile pioneered a
profound structural reform of its
social security pension system. It
did not have an impact on the
region until the 1990s, and then
mainly as a result of World Bank
policies and pressures. By the end
of 2000, 10 Latin American coun
tries had enacted pension reforms
but, instead of copying the suppos
edly universal Chilean prototype,
they followed three general
models:
1. Substitutive, similar to the
Chilean prototype and implement
ed in Bolivia (1997), Mexico
(1997), El Salvador (1998) and
Nicaragua (enacted in 2000 but
not enforced yet). In these coun
tries, the public system was closed
(new affiliations were not allowed)
and replaced with a “privately”
administered system (except in
Mexico, where management is
“multiple”; i.e., public, private or
mixed). The new “private” system
pays a pension based on the sum
accumulated in the insured’s indi
vidual account at the time of
retirement.
14
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2. Parallel, implemented in Peru
(1993) and Colombia (1994).
Under this model the public sys
tem was not closed but reformed,
becoming an alternative option to
a private system with similar char
acteristics to Chile’s. The current
and future insured are allowed to
switch between the two systems in
Colombia. The administration is
exclusively private in Peru but mul
tiple in Colombia.
3. M ixed, implemented in
Argentina (1994), Uruguay (1996)
and Costa Rica (2001). Here too
the public system was not closed
but reformed, becoming one of
two integrated components of a
new, mixed system: the public
component pays a basic pension,
while the “private” component is
administered by multiple institu
tions and pays a supplementary
pension.
O v e r s o l d P r iv a t iz a t io n
the
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In spite of “privatization,” half of
the systems in the 10 countries are
not exclusively managed by private
corporations. Four countries with
substitutive systems have exclusive
private administration (Chile,
Bolivia, El Salvador and Nicaragua,
in law), as does Peru in its parallel
private system. The three mixed
systems have a combination of
public administration in the basic
component and multiple adminis
trators in the supplementary com
ponent. In the parallel models of
Colombia and Peru, the public sys
tem is managed by social insur
ance, and both Colombia’s parallel
“private” system and Mexico’s sub

stitutive system have multiple
administrators. The percentage of
insured in the “private” system or
component varies significantly
among countries, from 100% in
Bolivia and Mexico to 97-90% in
Chile and El Salvador, 78-79% in
Argentina and Peru, and 49-40%
in Uruguay and Colombia (no data
are available yet for Costa Rica and
Nicaragua).
State intervention has proven to
be absolutely necessary for the
proper function and sustainability
of the “private” system, through
such mechanisms as mandatory
affiliation; strong and detailed pub
lic regulation of the system; con
trol, monitoring and sanctioning
through a supervisory public insti
tution (state-financed in several
countries); strict regulation of
investment instruments and rank
ing of them by a public institution;
and a triple fiscal subsidy.
Pension reforms of the substitu
tive and parallel types provoke
heavy fiscal costs that account for
this triple subsidy. First, the public
system incurs a deficit; left without
contributors, or only a minority of
them, it retains the burden of all
current pensions and those that
will be eventually granted to the
insured who stay in that system.
The state finances this deficit in all
countries. The second cost is the
value of the contributions paid to
the old system by all insured who
move to the new system (often
called a “recognition bond”). This
value is adjusted annually to infla
tion (except in Nicaragua), and
two countries (Colombia and
Chile) also pay an interest rate.
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A review o f the results after two decades
The state is responsible for this
cost in all countries except Mexico
and Uruguay (Peru has granted few
recognition bonds.) Third, a min
imum pension is guaranteed to all
insured in the new system whose
accumulated sum in the individual
account is insufficient to finance
the minimum level. The state is
responsible for this difference in
five countries (Chile, Colombia, El
Salvador, Mexico and Nicaragua, in
law). Neither Bolivia nor Peru
effectively grants this benefit.
Under the mixed model, the public
component may generate a deficit
(Argentina and Uruguay) or not
(Costa Rica), but there is no need
for a recognition bond, as the
insured is guaranteed a basic pen
sion in the public component.
T h e E l im in a t io n
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E ffects

Chilean reformers eliminated the
wage contributions paid by
employers to pension systems,
arguing that they caused a distor
tion in the labor market (i.e., an
incentive to substitute capital for
labor, hence restricting job cre
ation). Bolivia and Peru later fol
lowed suit. This argument has not
been theoretically or empirically
proved. The employer contribu
tion may be transferred to con
sumers or back to the workers,
thereby avoiding labor market dis
tortion. Most countries have not
eliminated the employer contribu
tion; four kept it unchanged
(Argentina, Costa Rica, El Salvador
and Mexico), one slightly reduced
it (Uruguay), and three actually
increased it (Colombia, Costa Rica
H em isphere Volume 10
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and Nicaragua). The insured con
tribution was slightly reduced in
Chile’s private system (but not in
the public one), remained
unchanged in Argentina, Costa
Rica and Mexico, and was
increased in six countries: Bolivia,
Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Peru and Uruguay. The financial
burden of pension reform, there
fore, has been shifted in most
countries from the employer to the
insured, and the elimination of the
employer contribution has led to
either an increase in the insured
contribution or the fiscal subsidy.
D

e c l in e in

C

overage

L abo r Force

The percentage of pension cover
age of the labor force in Latin
America has been positively corre
lated with the level of development
and, specifically, with the size of
the formal, salaried sector in any
given country. Prior to the reform,
the 10 countries under considera
tion fell into three groups: (1)
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and
Costa Rica, with 70% to 80% cov
erage; (2) Colombia, Mexico and
Peru, 32% to 44%; and (3) Bo
livia, El Salvador and Nicaragua,
12% to 23%.
The percentage of the labor force
covered after the reform can be
measured based on the number of
affiliates or active contributors.
The former are all those who have
joined the system at some point,
while the latter are affiliates who
contribute regularly. At the end of
1998, the percentages of coverage
based on affiliates and active con
tributors were, respectively: 72%
and 66% in Uruguay; 109% (sta
tistically impossible) and 59% in
Chile; 63% and 30% in Argentina;
44% and 23% in Colombia; 36%
and 23% in Mexico; 29% and
20% in El Salvador; 26% and 13%
in Peru; and 13% in Bolivia (no
iH em isphere Volume 10

“Privatization” of pensions varies among
countries and cannot be acheived without
significant state intervention and subsidies.
data on active contributors).
Estimates of affiliates before and
after the reform indicate a decline
in coverage in four countries; the
exceptions were Uruguay and El
Salvador (no significant change)
and Chile and Colombia (an
increase, but of doubtful magni
tude in the former). Estimates of
coverage based on active insured
cannot be compared with data
prior to the reform but they are
significantly lower than those based
on affiliates; the increase in the
insured contribution could be one
explanation for the fact that only
an average of 55% of affiliates are
active contributors (actual percent
ages range from 44% in Peru to
65% in Uruguay).
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Adequate competition among
administrators of “private” pension
programs is essential to improve
efficiency and reduce management
costs. In theory, administrators
compete for an insured population
that has sufficient information to
choose the best option, based on
the highest capital return and low
est management commission.
Available data suggest, however,
that this model of competition is
not functioning properly. The
eight pension reforms demonstrate
that the higher the number of
insured, the higher the number of
administrators, and vice versa.
Thus Mexico has 14 million
insured and 14 administrators;
Argentina, eight million and 13;
Chile, six million and eight;
Colombia, three million and six

(albeit with multiple types of
administrators, which facilitate
entry); Peru, two million and five;
El Salvador, 670,000 and three;
and Bolivia, 492,000 and two. In
the latter country, the number of
insured was so small that the gov
ernment decided the market would
allow only two administrators,
divided the insured between the
two by area of residence, and pro
hibited changes. As a result,
Bolivia has no competition, but
rather a duopoly.
Even with a fair number of
administrators, a significant per
centage of insured is concentrated
in the biggest three: 100% in El
Salvador and Bolivia (divided
between its two administrators);
78-75% in Chile and Peru (in
Chile this concentration has steadi
ly increased from 59% in 1983);
69-60% in Uruguay and
Colombia; 54% in Argentina; and
45% in Mexico, which sets a maxi
mum of 17% to each administra
tor. In Chile, the three administra
tors with the highest number of
insured have neither systematically
charged the lowest commissions
nor paid the highest capital returns
over time. Other reasons explain
why the insured select these
administrators: the work of sales
men who earn a commission for
every insured they move; gifts and
other treats given to the insured as
an incentive to switch; lack of
information or skills to make edu
cated decisions; and huge advertis
ing campaigns that fail to provide
data on performance.
If competition works improperly,
then administrative costs should
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not decline, a conclusion support
ed by data from nine countries.
The commission, exclusively paid
by the insured and usually imposed
on salaries, ranges from 4.1% in
Mexico; 3.8-3.0% in Peru,
Colombia, Argentina, El Salvador
and Nicaragua; and 2.6-2.5% in
Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia.
Historical trends show that com
missions have been stagnant or
experienced very little reduction.
The heavy administrative burden
on the insured can be assessed by
the percentage of wages that go
toward commission over the total
discount (commission plus deposit
in an individual account): 32-30%
in Peru, Argentina, El Salvador and
Mexico; 26-20% in Colombia,
Chile and Bolivia; and 17.5% in
Uruguay.
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According to the World Bank,
structural pension reform has sev
eral beneficial macroeconomic
effects. These include increased
capital accumulation and invest
ment in the capital market (which
becomes more developed and gen
erates a high capital return or
investment yield), and diversifica
tion of the pension fund portfolio.
These results in turn generate high
er national savings and economic
growth.
The data support some of these
assumptions but reject others.
Eight countries have registered sig
nificant capital accumulation in
their pension funds: $33.24 billion
and 40% of GDP in Chile; $16.78
billion and 5% of GDP in
Argentina; $8.30 billion and 2.5%
of GDP in Mexico; $2.92 billion
and 2.3% of GDP in Colombia;
$2,274 billion and 2.5% of GDP
in Peru; $472 million and 4% of
GDP in Bolivia; $477 million and

1.3% of GDP in Uruguay; and
$118 million and 0.4% of GDP in
El Salvador (in all cases, percent
ages are for 1998 or 1999 GDP).
Annual real average yields from the
inception of the reform until the
end of 1998 or mid 1999 have
been fairly high, too: 13% in
Argentina; 11.3% in Chile; 10.1%
in Colombia; 8% in Mexico; and
7.5-7.4% in Bolivia, Peru and
Uruguay. But these yields must be
interpreted with some caveats. The
figures are gross and administrative
costs should be deducted to obtain
net yields. In addition, all of the
systems, except Chile’s, began in
the 1990s when international mar
kets had very high returns; the
regional crises of 1995 and 19971998 reduced the yield consider
ably. Oscillations of the capital
market can generate quite different
pensions in times of boom or bust.
In Chile, for example, an insured
who entered the system in the
1980s will have a significantly
higher pension than one who
joined later.
Two studies of Chile, the coun
try with the longest reform in
operation and where many
assumptions have been tested,
show contradictory evidence con
cerning the impact on capital mar
kets and national savings. The first
study, commissioned and published
by tbe IMF, concluded that the
empirical evidence coincided with
the claim that pension reform con
tributed to financial market devel
opment and a more diversified
portfolio, but cautioned that the
results did not constitute sound
proof that the reform was the deci
sive factor in this outcome. The
IMF study also acknowledged that
the assumed impact of the Chilean
pension reform on national savings
was doubtful. The second study,
carried out by a high official of
Chile’s Ministry of Finance,

demonstrated that the net effect of
pension reform on national savings
was negative. In 1981-1996, it
found, the annual average capital
accumulated in individual accounts
was 2.7% of GDP, but the fiscal
cost was -5.7%, resulting in a neg
ative net outcome o f -2.6% of
GDP.
Chile’s pension fund portfolio is
more diversified than it was in
1983, when it was overwhelmingly
invested in public debt instruments
or deposited in state banks. By
1999, however, 37% of the portfo
lio was still in state debt paper, and
only 13% was in stocks. Other
countries have experienced little
diversification of their portfolios;
in Mexico, El Salvador, Bolivia and
Uruguay, from 64% to 97% of the
investment was in government debt
paper in 1999. The proportion of
investment in stocks was nil in five
countries and only had significant
shares in Peru (27%), Argentina
(17%) and Chile (13%).
As these results show, “privatiza
tion” of pensions varies among the
10 countries and cannot be
achieved without significant state
intervention and subsidies. The
outcome of reform has been mixed
and many of its alleged positive
effects have not materialized. This
is an important lesson for the rest
of Latin America and other regions
of the world considering reform
programs.

Carmelo M esa-Lago is a professor
a n d research scholar in intern ation al
relations a n d Latin A merican studies
at Florida In ternational University.
He is the au thor o f Market, Socialist
a n d M ixed E conomies: C om parative
P olicy a n d P erform ance - Chile,
Cuba a n d Costa Rica.
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A Silent Enemy
by Max B. Rothman and Burton D. Dunlop

E

lder abuse in the United
States, as in many other
countries, traditionally
has not been a high-prior
ity policy issue. Typically,
it has been overshadowed by more
visible cases of domestic violence and
child abuse. Except for an occasional
high-profile case in a nursing home
or other institutional setting, elder
abuse, particularly when it involves
family members in the home, does
not receive much public discussion
or analysis. Unfortunately, as case
loads continue to rise, many impor
tant issues remain in addressing the
dynamics of treatment and preven
likely involves the underreporting of
tion. Better understanding of these
actual cases, but additional issues
issues in the United States may help
were identified that may be of
countries throughout the Americas
importance to other jurisdictions.
identify concerns in their own soci
These include understanding the
eties and design policies and pro
profiles of abuse victims and perpe
grams to confront them.
trators; the level of recidivism; race,
ethnicity and cultural influences; risk
Pa t t e r n s o f A b u s e
factors; the use of available data to
Elder abuse can be an act of com
assist policymakers and those respon
mission whereby either physical or
sible for investigations; the availabili
psychological injury is inflicted on
ty of appropriate treatment models;
another person. It also can be mani
professional training; and communi
fested as neglect, the failure to fulfill
ty awareness.
an obligation or duty to another per
The reason for the apparent under
son, or as exploitation, the illegal use
reporting of cases of elder abuse in
of another’s property. A national US
Miami-Dade County is unclear.
study of 1996 data estimated that of
Hispanics represent nearly 60% of all
approximately 44 million older
older adults in the county. We spec
adults 60 and above, 450,000 had
ulate that this group is significantly
experienced abuse, neglect or
less likely to report elder abuse, espe
exploitation. This figure constitutes
cially when it occurs in the family.
an incident rate of around 10 per
Unfortunately, the state of Florida
1,000 older adults.
agency responsible for investigating
A study the authors conducted of
and providing services for victims
1997 data for Miami-Dade County,
does not collect data on ethnicity.
Florida identified an incident rate of
Therefore, we could not analyze the
5.36 per 1,000, or only 54% of the
profiles of victims and perpetrators
national rate. The discrepancy most
based on this critical variable.
H em isphere Volume 10

A crucial factor that emerged from
the data, however, is the age of both
the victims and the perpetrators of
abuse. Nearly one-half of substanti
ated cases involved victims 80 years
of age or older. People in this age
group were victims of maltreatment
at a rate more than 2.5 times their
proportion in the total population of
older adults. Approximately threequarters of victims were white and
one-quarter were black. Women
were victims in nearly two-thirds of
substantiated cases.
More than 86% of perpetrators
were under 60 years of age compared
to 66% nationwide, strongly suggest
ing that perpetrators are significantly
younger in Miami-Dade County.
More children or younger family
members seem to be committing
elder abuse in this area, but again,
the reasons are unclear. Three-fifths
of perpetrators were white and a little
more than one-quarter were black
(the rest were categorized as “other”
or “unknown”). Approximately
53.5% of cases involved female per
petrators, climbing to 56.2% in cases
involving a male victim.
T r a c k in g
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Some of the patterns that emerged
from the Miami-Dade data have sig
nificant implications for the way
authorities address elder abuse. For
example, a third of the South Florida
cases involved at least one previous
incident within the last year. This
statistic leads us to conclude that the
system of intervention and assistance
to victims is not working effectively.
One major reason for this failure
may be a lack of important informa
tion at the state agency responsible
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Elder abuse in Miami-Dade County, Florida
for this system. Knowledge of risk
factors or indicators that can be used
to predict future abuse is critical to
the state’s ability to respond effective
ly in terms of identification, inter
vention and prevention. If case data
that address the issue of risk are not
collected and made easily retrievable
for those engaged in the system, the
state’s ability to carry out its responsi
bilities is dramatically reduced.
Many different factors may con
tribute to elder abuse. Researchers
have been able to describe the ele
ments typically identified in family
abuse situations, including victim
characteristics, perpetrator character
istics, and the history and dynamics
of their interaction. The literature
strongly suggests that the primary
risk factors are: 1) past abuse; 2)
physical or mental dysfunction of the
older person; 3) financial dependen
cy of an adult child; 4) emotional ill
health of a dependent adult child;
and 5) social isolation of the family.
Such patterns could be discerned if
information were available to track
health status measurements, such as
household structure (including the
ages and relationships of each house
hold member), and mental or per
sonality disorders of victims and
alleged perpetrators. Recording and
computerizing the data that could
help track these factors would assist
key staff in achieving the state’s goals.
Another major factor that limits
the state’s ability to respond more
effectively to abusive situations is the
low level of funding and the scope of
services provided. The only source
of funding in Florida is for long
term care services for the victim; e.g.,
in-home services designed for frail

elders. These services are limited to
addressing the victims physical situa
tion, not the underlying issues of
intra-family violence and prevention
of future episodes of abuse. The
state has no responsibility to address
issues related to the perpetrator.
K
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Elder abuse is a complex issue that
requires a more comprehensive
model of explanation and treatment.
Experience in responding to the
broader category of domestic vio
lence in the United States offers
insight into the elements required to
design a more comprehensive
approach.
Models for addressing elder abuse
should emphasize crisis intervention.
In addition to the hotlines that
already exist to report abuse, they
should provide for special shelters,
support groups, safety planning for
the victims, imposition of legal sanc
tions, and anger management servic
es for the perpetrators. All of these
approaches are intended to under
score the importance of providing
opportunities for victims to become
more independent.
One of the most valuable lessons
learned from the domestic violence
experience is the importance of
insuring that the issue of elder abuse
has high visibility among both pro
fessionals and the public. Designers
and implementers of treatment and
prevention models have an ongoing
responsibility to ensure that profes
sionals working in the system—
investigators, police, fire-rescue per
sonnel and others— receive both preand in-service training in the issues

addressed here. Training in inves
tigative skills, understanding the
importance and usefulness of case
information and other related topics,
such as substance abuse and sexual
abuse, is vital to the success of state
efforts. Those most likely to report
elder abuse—doctors, nurses, social
workers and others who come into
regular contact with older adults—
should be educated about risk factors
and how to identify them. All pro
fessionals need to understand the
cultural dimensions of abuse and
should be part of the continuing
effort to expand community aware
ness about elder abuse prevention,
reporting and intervention.
Public awareness is perhaps the
most important factor in a commu
nity’s effort to prevent the occurrence
of elder abuse. Public education
campaigns related to each of the
issues discussed here should be
launched in collaboration with clergy
and religious institutions as well as
the local media, which can be effec
tive in targeting geographic areas
with high rates of abuse. The more
information the public has about
what constitutes abuse, how to rec
ognize it, how and where to report
it, what happens when a report is
made, and what resources are avail
able to assist victims, the more effec
tively a community can generate
resources to combat it.

Max B. Rothman, J.D., LL.M. is exec
utive director o f Florida International
University’s Center on Aging. Burton
D. Dunlop, Ph.D. is the cen ter’s direc
tor o f research.
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Battling a Killer
by M aria Esther Lozano Davila, Jorge Chavez Samperio and M artin Perez Ramos
ne of Mexico’s most
notable social
accomplishments in
recent years is a sig
O
nificant decline in
mortality rates. Over the last four
decades, average life expectancy has
increased dramatically. Forty years
ago, Mexican men could expect to
live to the age of 56.5; today, male
life expectancy is 72.8. The
increase for women has been equal
ly impressive, from 59.3 to 77.3.
This change, along with a decline
in the birth rate, has altered the
demographic profile of the country.
For the first time, Mexico has had
to confront the social impact that
results from a steady increase in the
aging population.
As the nation’s largest health care
provider, the Instituto Mexicano de
Seguro Social (IMSS) has experi
enced the pressure of this popula
tion shift. In 1999, IMSS servic
es—a benefit available to workers
and their families—reached
43,249,762 Mexicans, or 53.23%
of the population. Older adults
accounted for 12% of this total.
The number of older adults using
the institute’s services increased sig
nificantly during the latter half of
the 1990s. In 1994, IMSS had
2,495,571 clients who were more
than 60 years old; by 1998, this fig
ure had risen to 3,040,460, or
60.9% of Mexicans in this age
group.
Over the same period, an econo
my geared more toward industrial
development has led to lifestyle
changes that imply new health risks
for older adults. A shift toward
diets high in fat and salt; increased
H em isphere Volume 10

alcohol and tobacco consumption;
longer and more stressful work
schedules—all have affected pat
terns of health, illness, infirmity
and death. Mexico is experiencing
an epidemiological transition typi
cal of developing countries, in
which communicable diseases such
as respiratory and intestinal infec
tions continue to be a problem
even as chronic degenerative dis
eases are on the rise.
E d u c a t io n
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In recognition of the growing
numbers of elderly Mexicans,
IMSS has made serving this group
one of its priorities via a special
area known as the Programa de
Atencion a la Salud del Adulto
Mayor (Older Adult Health
Awareness Program). The program
has a double focus: first, it encour
ages seniors to volunteer as com
munity health advocates; and sec
ond, it emphasizes a holistic
approach that includes a range of
educational, preventive, assisted liv
ing, recreational, cultural and social
programs. Among the most
important preventive measures is
vaccination against pneumonia,
one of the leading causes of death
and illness among older IMSS
patients.
In the last three years, cardiovas
cular ailments, cancer, diabetes and
pneumonia topped the list of the
10 leading causes of death among
the 65 and older population in
Mexico. This held true for both
the national population and IMSS
patients. The very young and the
elderly are the populations most
susceptible to pneumonia. The

risk increases if the patient already
suffers from heart problems, chron
ic respiratory difficulties, diabetes,
alcoholism, cirrhosis of the liver, or
any condition that weakens natural
immunological defenses to the dis
ease.
IMSS introduced the pneumo
coccus vaccine as part of the Older
Adult Health Awareness Program
in 1994. The previous year, the
institute attempted to overcome
public skepticism with an educa
tional campaign to increase under
standing of the importance of
immunization for those over the
age of 60. The campaign culmi
nated with a nationwide health fair,
where the vaccine was offered for
the first time. Since then, Mexico
has instituted National Health
Weeks two times a year to reinforce
the vaccination program across the
country. In 1994, 485,230 people
were vaccinated; by 1998, the fig
ure had nearly doubled, to
940,933. Six years after it was
introduced, the vaccine had been
applied to 77.54% of IMSS
patients in the 60 and older group.
The type of vaccine used by
IMSS—a combination of 23 poly
saccharides considered to be
responsible for 80% of pneumonia
cases in most countries around the
world—has been reported in the
medical literature to confer an
average of five years of immunity
to pneumonia, and in some cases
up to 10 years. The period of
immunity can be significantly less
in children with diseases of the
spleen or kidneys, and in older
adults with multiple myeloma,
Hodgkin’s disease or renal failure.
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Public health campaigns reduce pneumonia cases
among older Mexicans

Ea r l y S u c c e ss R ates

In 1994, when the vaccination
campaign started, IMSS patients
had a slightly greater incidence of
pneumonia than did patients using
clinics affiliated with the Secretary
of Health, which are open to all
Mexicans. Over the next several
years, however, this tendency was
reversed. From 1994 to 1998, the
rate of pneumonia among IMSS
patients rose by 57.41%, compared
to 67.30% nationally. The rate of
infection among IMSS patients
began a gradual decline in 1997,
although mortality rates from the
disease remained relatively con
stant.

In addition to the decline in
infection rates, the vaccination
effort can be credited with launch
ing public health awareness cam
paigns that have found a positive
response among the older adult
population, as evidenced by the
nearly 80% vaccination rate among
this group.
Vaccination campaigns cannot be
judged by their short-term effects.
Many other factors may have con
tributed to the decline in cases of
death and illness from pneumonia
in Mexico, among them socioeco
nomic levels and cultural and envi
ronmental influences. These fac
tors may play a role in the discrep

ancy between the illness rates
reported by IMSS and the
Secretary of Health.
Epidemiological studies to deter
mine the level of antibodies in the
older adult population will be key
to rating the vaccine’s ultimate
effectiveness.

Dr. M aria Esther Lozano D dvila
runs the O lder A dult H ealth
Awareness Program a t the Instituto
M exicano d e Seguro S ocial (IMSS).
Dr. Jo rge Chdvez Sam perio a n d Dr.
M artin Perez Ramos are m ed ical
program coordinators.
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Surviving at Home
by Ursula M. Karsch
razil holds the second
highest mortality rate
for stroke victims in the
world. This cerebrovas
cular accident is the
number one cause of death among
Brazilian men and women aged 65
and over. However, although reli
able data on survival rates after
stroke and degrees of disability are
not yet available, the proportion of
cerebrovascular disease as a cause of
death in Brazil has been decreasing
in the last 20 years among both
sexes (male: 18.7% in 1980 and
16.7% in 1991; female: 21.0% in
1980 and 18.1% in 1991). As
more patients survive strokes, many
require ongoing care to cope with
disabilities and perform routine
daily tasks. The observed declining
trend in case fatality makes it likely
that the prevalence of stroke-related
disability will increase in the com
ing decades. In a health care sys
tem that lacks the resources for
long-term care, this places a heavy
burden on families, the most com
mon caregivers for dependent eld
ers. The largest share of this bur
den falls on women—daughters
and wives—who often must give
up jobs that they hold outside the
home to care for their relatives,
even when the additional income
from their employment is sorely
needed.
This article presents a few results
of a study sponsored by the
Overseas Development
Administration, with grants from
the Sandoz Foundation for
Gerontological Research and
Brazil’s Conselho Nacional de
Pesquisa. It examined the caregiv-
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Caregiving arrangements for stroke survivors in
Sao Paulo, Brazil
ing arrangements of 102 people
who experienced functional losses
after suffering a first episode of
stroke at age 50 or over. In addi
tion to yielding a profile of primary
caregivers, the findings allow a
glimpse of trends in the living situ
ations of elderly stroke victims,
many of whom are housebound
after they are discharged from the
hospital, and the coping strategies
adopted by their caregivers.
T he Sam ple

The study began in 1992 with an
initial sample of 168 cases recruited
among seven hospitals in various
districts of Sao Paulo, Brazil’s
largest city. According to the 1991
Brazilian census, the proportion of
men and women aged 65 and over
living in urban centers increased by
more than 30% since 1950. The
latest figures available show 72.6%
of men in this age group and
79.7% of women living in cities,
making urban areas the most likely
setting for elders surviving in
dependent care arrangements.
Like most of Brazil’s major met
ropolitan areas, Sao Paulo is located
in the southeastern part of the
country. This region boasts excel
lent medical assistance and a rela
tive abundance of hospitals, and it
has the highest level of per capita
income in the country. It is also
characterized by better working
conditions and living standards
than other parts of Brazil.
Of the initial 168 cases, 17 were
used for pre-testing the question
naire. The research began with the
remaining 151 cases. During the
data collection process, many cases

were lost as patients refused to take
part in the study, moved away from
town, were unreachable for data
collection, survived with no func
tional loss or died. The final sam
ple included 102 cases.
Patients aged 50 years and over
were visited in their homes three
times over a period of about one
year after the first stroke episode.
On each of the visits their care
givers were interviewed by means of
a questionnaire. The interviews
gathered data about the profiles of
the caregivers and the family sup
port they received, as well as the
dynamics of care provided for the
dependent person.
Of the 102 patients, 80 survived
with functional loss: 44.6% had
partial paralysis, 3.6% were com
pletely paralyzed and 25.0% experi
enced partial hemiplegia. In addi
tion, 19.6% of patients had diffi
culty in communicating, 9.8% pre
sented visual problems, 14.7% had
difficulty swallowing, and 34.3%
suffered mental disorders. Most
patients had more than one of these
impairments combined with other
losses of functions. More than
50% were unable to perform their
usual daily activities and 71.6%
were unable to leave the house on
their own. Almost 70% were total
ly dependent on someone else to
accomplish at least one basic every
day task.
Of the patients surveyed, 61.8%
were married and 23.5% were wid
owed. Forty-five (44.1%) were
married to their caregivers. Eightynine (87.3%) of the caregivers were
women; 67 of them (67.6%) were
between 40 and 74 years old. In

total, 80.3% of the caregivers were
40 years old and over and 78.43%
were aged 60 and over. Almost
58.8% of the caregivers were of the
same generation as their patients—
50 years of age and over—with a
high concentration (38.2%) of
caregivers aged 60 and over taking
care of 80.3% of patients aged 60
and over. In other words, twothirds of the sample featured one
elderly person looking after anoth
er. Of the primary caregivers,
39.2% were the patients’ wives and
31.3% were daughters, confirming
the vital role played by spouses as
caregivers. Children were second to
spouses in acting as caregivers
(36.2%); 6.9% were sons-in-law or
daughters-in-law.
H

o u se h o ld
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Finances were a strain for most
families in the sample. Nearly twothirds—62.8%—had monthly
incomes below $500 and 10%
earned less than $100 a month.
Almost 18% were couples living
together, 11 % on $200 monthly
income. This amount correspond
ed at the time of the study to two
pensions of one Brazilian minimum
wage each.
More than three-quarters—
79.4%—of the stroke survivors
lived in households of more than
three persons, including themselves.
Fifty-six percent were living in their
own homes and had acquired those
properties 30 or 40 years before,
when they were in a better financial
situation and real estate prices were
lower. Only two patients lived in
shantytowns. Twelve percent lived
in their children’s homes and 11%
H em isphere Volume 10
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The largest share of the burden falls on
women—daughters and wives—who often
must give up jobs that they hold outside the
home to care for their relatives, even when
the additional income from their employ
ment is sorely needed.
in their caregivers’ homes. Most—
81.4%—lived in detached houses,
which had been enlarged to accom
modate married children over the
years. The high cost of rent in
Brazilian cities probably explains
this kind of living arrangement for
different generations. It seems to
be the basis for strategies of reor
ganizing family roles and is also a
means for cooperation when an
older relative becomes impaired.
Ninety percent of the houses visited
were in older parts of town where
sewage, electricity and water sup
plies were available, confirming the
fact that a large proportion of
Brazil’s elderly reside in well-established urban districts.
Most of the dwellings were sim
ple. The majority were modest
masonry houses, which in many
cases lacked final touches such as
painted walls or even cupboards.
Bedridden patients (18%) always
occupied what appeared to be the
best bed in the house. Twentyeight percent slept alone in their
own bedrooms and 53% with the
caregiver in the same room.
C
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New living arrangements
required many families to devise
ingenious methods to meet the
challenges of caring for a disabled
relative. A quarter of the cases,
especially those involving two-story
houses, showed evidence of home
H em isphere Volume 10

modification to meet patients’
needs. On the ground floor, living
rooms were adapted to enable
patients to spend the day there.
Extra bathrooms were added on,
usually making use of kitchen pipe
systems, so that patients would not
have to climb the stairs to reach the
facilities. Beds were equipped with
bars taken from the cradles of
grown grandchildren. Eighteen
percent of the families reported
recycling and adapting various
materials they had at home for use
in daily care, thereby avoiding the
need to buy new items. Metal con
tainers were turned into bedpans;
plastic chairs from the kitchen
served double duty as shower
chairs; broomsticks were trans
formed into walking sticks. The
kitchen sink substituted for an exer
cise bar, and in one house, a pulley
with a hanging rope was installed
on the bedroom ceiling to help the
patient exercise his legs. In other
cases, bed sheets or towels served
the same purpose.
Although 76.5% of patients’ chil
dren did not live with their parents
before the stroke, family reorganiza
tion resulted in some 4% moving
back into their parents’ homes.
Fifty percent of patients began
receiving regular visits from their
children, and in 25.5% of these
cases the children took over shop
ping previously done by the
patients before the stroke episode

occurred. Grandchildren and
friends also visited more often dur
ing the first year after the stroke
episode.
Thirty percent of the caregivers
changed their daily domestic rou
tines to care for the stroke patient.
They varied their sleeping sched
ules, going to sleep after the
patients and waking up before
them. They began dressing patients
in clothing that was easier to put
on and to remove, and special pads
and sheets were adapted to the beds
of those suffering from inconti
nence.
A 63-year-old alcoholic, who had
been separated for a year and a half
from his wife of 35 years, stopped
drinking and moved back into their
house to take care of her after she
suffered a stroke. This man was a
bricklayer who earned around $250
a month. Without proper equip
ment or any type of orientation, he
created his own coping strategies.
At first, he gave his wife sponge
baths in bed and carried her to the
bathroom in his arms. Later, he
began to transport her by placing
her feet on top of his feet and, in a
move that resembled dancing,
walking her around the house or
outdoors to get some sun.
One woman who used to live
alone began to look after her 66year-old neighbor. Every day she
would go to the patient’s house to
help with chores. When she
returned home, she would leave the
neighbor sitting by the window so
that she could keep an eye on her.
A patient who could not leave
her bed when the interviewers first
visited was supported by her five
children. One of her daughters left
her job to take care of her impaired
mother. A year after the stroke, the
interviewers returned to find the
patient in the kitchen, where she
was able to cook meals for the fam
ily. She had learned to get around
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with the aid of a walking stick, thus
allowing her children to go back to
work and bring in a higher month
ly income.
Fa m i l y B u r d e n s

Home health care in Brazil is a
role traditionally undertaken by the
family, especially by women, even
when they have employment
responsibilities outside the home.
Men take on caregiving tasks most
often when they are the spouse or
son of the dependent person.
Caring for a dependent elder puts
heavy strains on a family. Money,
time, space and privacy are all con
cerns. These pressures appear to be
most pronounced immediately fol
lowing the patient’s arrival home
and after a longer period has
elapsed. In the three cases
described above, for example, the

caregivers’ outlooks varied during
the first year following the stroke.
Most (64.3%) were more positive
about their situations when inter
viewed for the second time. More
of those interviewed on the third
visit, one year after the stroke
episode, were likely to have a nega
tive assessment, reflecting the strain
of long-term caregiving.
The lack of social policies in
Brazil for dependent elders and of
public health programs to provide
long-term care for adults with func
tional losses and social handicaps
leaves family and friends with the
responsibility to provide care and
support. The percentage of
patients in this study requiring
assistance with personal care rou
tines in the 12 to 14 months fol
lowing the first episode of stroke
shows the need for a public health

program to provide caregivers with
information, orientation and some
kind of support network. Such a
program would be cost effective in
the long term, contributing to
faster rehabilitation and improved
coping strategies while reducing re
hospitalization and the use of nurs
ing homes.

Dr. Ursula M. Karsch is a professor
a n d researcher a t the Pontificia
U niversidade Catolica in Sao Paulo,
Brazil. The research f o r this p ro ject
was in itia ted by Dr. Alexandre
Kalache, director o f the World Health
Organizations Program on Health
a n d Aging, w ho a t the tim e o f the
study was a professor a t the London
S chool o f H ygiene a n d Tropical
M edicine.
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Prison of Dreams
by Vida Yovanovich

I

was about to reach 40, and so
much was moving inside of
m e.. .M y mother had just
been diagnosed with
Parkinson’s. I’m terribly
afraid of old age!
My first self-portrait was the
product of a self-imposed task.
One morning I set my camera on
the tripod, stood in front of it, and
clicked. Well, this is pretty simple,
I thought. Later, when I looked
closely at the contact sheet, I closed
my eyes and cried. I could not
believe it. How could a self-portrait
give away everything inside like
that, everything that’s hidden and
protected?
The image was perfectly framed,
with a hardness that, even today,
hurts me when I look at it. The
photograph remained in a drawer
for years. I did not mention it, I
did not show it, I did not recognize
it within myself. I hid it.
I think it is difficult to put what
one feels into photographs, the
things one goes through as one
takes them, and at the same time it
is impossible to forget, or become
detached from the experience.
It took me quite a few years to
finish this project, set in an old-age
home in Mexico. Time, the passing
of time, and the fraying the passing
of time causes...
And I took my time, to little by
little come closer to this world of
women’s old age.. .Most were
women, there were only a handful
of men because men die younger.
Women are alone in the end, easily
abandoned.
It was like ripping myself open.
At first, whenever I left the home,
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I’d wash my hands with a terrible
sense of contagion. I could not
photograph, I could only feel.
Over the years, I became trans
parent. I became one of them, part
of the place itself. It was hard at
night. The women who during the
day had been my friends, at night
became my enemies and, in the
dark, would scream at me to go
away.
When I took my self-portrait, I
guess I was depicting my inability
to face up to time, my passage
through time, my fear of death, and
the knowledge that not only the old
women were dying, but many
things inside me were also dying.
These are photographic closeups,
to help me understand and accept
in me, the passing of time.

Vida Yovanovich is a photographer in
M exico City. H er work has appeared
in books, magazines a n d exhibits
a rou n d the world. She was aw arded
a Simon G uggenheim Fellowship in
2000 a n d has served on the board o f
directors o f the M exican C ouncil o f
Photography. The text a n d im ages in
this ph oto essay are excerpts fro m her
book, Cdrcel d e los suenos (Mexico
City: Casa d e las Imdgenes,
D irection G eneral d e Publicaciones,
Centro d e la Imagen, 1997). Her
photographs are also displayed a t
w ww .zonezero.com . She can be
reached a t vidayov@ terra.com.mx.
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Spain’s New Empire
by Gregory D. Cancelada
The Reconquest o f the New
World: M ultinational Enterprises
and Spain’s Direct Investment in
Latin America, by Pablo Toral.
United Kingdom: Ashgate
Publishing Ltd., 2 0 0 1.

W hile covering the 1998 annual
conference of the Inter-American
Development Bank, I asked a
French banker about the Spanish
invasion of Latin American bank
ing. The topic intrigued me since
I found pat answers unconvincing
and unable to explain why other
global players stood on the side
lines while BBV and Santander
gobbled up local banks.
“Of course they have to go to
Latin America. Where else can
they go? They can’t compete in
Europe,” the banker snorted.
Although clearly an example of
sour grapes and in no way a com
plete explanation, the comment
was illuminating.
I was searching for further
insight from The R econquest o f the
N ew World: M ultinational
Enterprises a n d Spains D irect
In vestm en t in Latin A merica, by
Pablo Toral.
The book, based on Toral’s mas
ter’s thesis, is an ambitious work
and quite timely. The Spanish
multinational enterprise (MNE)
has had a tremendous impact on
the Latin American banking,
telecommunications, energy and
aviation sectors, and until now no
extensive studies have explored
why and how.
Toral’s biggest contribution is
linking Spanish MNE behavior to
the liberalization of Spain’s econo-

THE PO LIT IC AL EC O N O M Y OF LATIN AM ERICA SERIES

OF THE NEW WORLD
Multinational enterprises and Spain's
direct investment in Latin America

Pablo Toral
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Spanish firms were forced to become multi
national enterprises in response to greater
competition in their home markets as the
European Union forced down trade and
investment barriers. This coincided with
Latin America’s own liberalization and need
for foreign capital.
my. He paints an interesting pic
ture of Spanish firms forced to
become MNEs in response to
greater competition in their home
markets as the European Union
forced down trade and investment
barriers. Foreign competition at
home was a key impetus for mov
ing abroad, which in turn coincid
ed with Latin America’s own liber
alization and need for foreign capi
tal.
The author then tries to explain
why particular Spanish sectors
went into Latin America and other
foreign MNEs failed to compete
aggressively against the Spanish.
He offers some diverse reasons,
such as cultural affinity and the
activist role of the Spanish state,
but finds they aren’t adequate
explanations for the behavior of
Spanish MNEs.
Drawing on the ideas of econo
mist Stephen Hymer, Toral distills
two reasons that Spanish MNEs
aggressively entered Latin America.
He integrates other theories, but
these appear to be the key ones.
First, the Spanish had a different
perception of risk in Latin America
than did other foreign competitors.
For a variety of reasons, Spanish
businessmen had more confidence
in the ability of Latin American
policymakers to implement pro
found economic reforms.
H em isphere Volume 10

Second, Spanish MNEs were
looking to control Latin American
businesses, versus making portfolio
investments, to make the most of
their competitive advantage. This
advantage stems from the fact that
Spain only recently became a
developed country and thus had
valuable knowledge of how a
developing economy functioned
and what kind of services it need
ed.
These arguments raise some
important questions about the link
between MNE theory and the
actual behavior of the Spanish
MNEs.
For example, the author says that
Telefonica, the Spanish telephone
giant, had a competitive advantage
in Latin America since it could
expand access to the general popu
lation, while US telecom MNEs
only focused on implementing the
latest technology (pp. 132, 172).
This assertion is extremely impor
tant for Toral, since it plays into
point two and is really the only
reason he gives for Telefonica’s suc
cess in the region.
Is he right? The argument
sounds reasonable, but only a
vague comment by a Telefonica
executive is offered to back it up.
In fact, line growth— a basic
yardstick for measuring fixed-line
expansion—for Telefonos de

Mexico (Telmex) in 1999 and
2000 was much higher than rates
by Telefonica’s Argentine, Peruvian
and Chilean operations. Yearly
line growth by Telefonica’s Latin
American operations managed to
stay in double digits over the past
two years due solely to the compa
ny’s Brazilian operations. Telmex,
which is controlled by Carso
Global Telecom, has SBC Corp of
the United States as its strategic
telecommunications partner.
Toral uses similar assertions to
explain the success of the Spanish
banks. He argues that banks such
as BBV (now BBVA) and
Santander (now BSCH) were
attracted to Latin America not
because the region offered higher
returns than in the Spanish mar
ket, but because they could meet
the financial needs of the public
and local businesses (p. 149, 150).
This competitive advantage was
due to the fact that Spain was a
developing financial market during
the 1970s and 1980s, according to
Toral.
But if the Spanish offered a
range of financial products and
services seen as superior by the
general public, why was the
Spanish business model driven by
acquisitions? W hy not head-tohead competition, in which the
Spanish banks expanded their busi
ness by building new branches and
offices?
I suspect that acquisitions are
not only a cheaper route, but also
that Spanish products are not in
fact superior to those offered by
local bankers. The heavy promo
tion of lotteries to bank account
holders is an indication that gam
bling is more effective in attracting
customers to Spanish banks than
the strength of their products.
Instead, Spanish banks’ competi
tive advantage versus local banks
probably lies in greater efficiency,
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which translates into enhanced
profitability rather than higher
deposit rates or lower transaction
fees for the public. The Spanish
banks are able to be more efficient
thanks to better lending and credit
risk experience, technology and
access to cheap international capi
tal.
Still, the Spanish banks’ advan
tages are no greater than those
enjoyed by other foreign banks.
The question remains why other
foreign competitors have had a low
profile in Latin America, at least
until the last few years.
As Toral points out, Spanish
banks were quite aggressive in the
privatization of local banks seized
by Latin American governments
during financial crises in the 1980s
and 1990s. Again, he claims that
Spanish banks had more confi
dence in policymakers’ ability to
turn around the macroeconomic
situation, and saw growth potential
instead of the risks seen by other
foreign banks (p. 149).
An equally convincing explana
tion, however, is that Spanish
banks, due to their lack of interna
tional experience prior to the
1980s, didn’t understand crossborder risk and expanded well
beyond a conservative banker’s
limits.
This is not as farfetched as it
might sound. BBVA and BSCH
are facing a tough situation in
Argentina, where the country may
not be able to sustain the 10-yearold currency board system that
pegs the peso to the dollar.
If Toral needs to construct elabo
rate competitive advantages that
are unique to the Spanish MNEs it
is because he rejects return on
equity (ROE) as a driving force for
MNE behavior (p. 4).
W hile he is correct in noting
that ROE by itself does not prop
erly explain MNE behavior, dis

missing it outright removes a pow
erful tool in understanding MNE
motivation, at least among public
companies with active sharehold
ers.
ROE not only can explain why
Spanish banks jumped into Latin
America, but it also offers a reason
why US banks avoided the region.
During the 1980s and 1990s,
financial liberalization was occur
ring in the fragmented US banking
industry. Banks were not only able
to offer new products and services
that were previously regulated
heavily or prohibited, but also
could now easily cross state and
regional borders. US banks could
sharply raise their ROE by enter
ing new lines of business or
through mergers and acquisitions.
On the other hand, Spanish
banks were already universal
banks—i.e., they could offer a full
range of financial products and
services— and the market was
highly consolidated. The possibili
ty of higher ROE in fragmented
and underdeveloped markets seems
a more compelling incentive.
That isn’t to say that Spanish
MNEs didn’t have a particular
competitive advantage versus other
multinationals. Toral points out
some possibilities, but one of the
most important is undoubtedly the
Spanish language itself.
Toral sees language as merely
facilitating interactions (p. 130)
and puts it in the general category
of “cultural affinity.”
The common language is
extremely important, however. It
permits Spanish firms not only to
move human capital (managers,
technicians) more quickly and effi
ciently than US firms, but also
allows them to impose their busi
ness model through the export of
Spanish managers into Latin
America. Replicating management
on such a scale would seem to

greatly reduce the risk that a busi
ness model can’t be successfully
executed.
The main weakness of the book
lies with its sourcing. The author
obtained much of his material
from official sources (reports by
Spanish government and multilat
eral organizations), economists and
academics, with a smattering of
newspaper and magazine items.
However, to understand the behav
ior and local environment of
MNEs, one should consult such
basic sources as annual reports, fil
ings with US and Spanish securi
ties regulators, analysts’ reports,
industry magazines, specialty
financial publications, intensive
searches in key newspapers, and
interviews with executives and ana
lysts who cover the companies and
sectors. Toral sourced the
Telefonica annual report for only
one year (2000) and included no
annual reports for Spanish banks, a
serious omission.
Toral’s study is a useful overview
of the MNE literature and global
analysis of Spanish capital flows
into Latin America. It is a first
step in developing a solid, insight
ful and credible explanation of
Spanish MNE behavior.

G regory D. C ancelada began cover
in g Latin A merican business new s in
1990. Previously the Caracas
bureau c h i e f fo r D ow Jon es a n d the
M exico City bureau c h i e f fo r
BridgeN ews, h e is currently a busi
ness reporter a t the St. Louis PostDispatch.
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Aging in Latin America
by M arian Goslinga

I

Ageing in Latin America: Myths,
n today’s youth-oriented cul
Stereotypes, and Social Justice.
ture, aging is not a popular
A geing International, vol. 19, no. 2
topic. Yet the graying of the
(July 1992), pp. 26-29.
world’s population is forcing
us to come face to face with
the issue and its corollaries— retireAlvarez, Maria D., and Otto Von
Mering, eds. Aging, Demography,
ment, living facilities, pension
funds, medical care and poverty. and Well-Being in Latin America.
Gainesville, Fla.: Center for
No longer can we ignore the
Gerontological Studies, University
challenges posed by an aging popu
of Florida, 1989. 161 pp
lation. Global life expectancy has
grown more in the last 50 years
Anzola Perez, Elias, ed. La atenthan over the previous 5000. Until
cion de los ancianos: un desafio
the Industrial Revolution, people
para los anos noventa. Washing
aged 65 and over never constituted
ton, D.C.: Pan American Health
more than 2% or 3% of the popu
Organization, 1994. 488 pp.
lation. In today’s developed world,
they amount to 14%. By the year
-----[etal.]. Analisis comparativo
2030, according to United Nations
del envejecimiento en Brasil,
estimates, they will reach 25% to
Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica y
30%, placing an unprecedented
Venezuela. Washington, D.C.: Pan
burden on working-age people.
American Health Organization,
As far as Latin America and the
1993. 18 pp.
Caribbean are concerned, it is
expected that, by the year 2025, the
Bahamon Vargas, Berenice. El lidregion’s elderly will constitute
erazgo del anciano en America
10.8% of the population—an
Latina. Bogota: Consejo Episcopal
increase of more than 3.5% since
Latinoamericano, 1994. 198 pp.
2000 .
This stunning growth of the eld
Barrientos, Armando. Economic
erly—due mostly to medical
Risks, the Labour Market, and
advances and social provisions—
Older Workers in Latin America.
demands the urgent attention of
Hertford, Eng.: Business School,
governments, think tanks and
University of Hertfordshire, 1999.
research centers.
25 pp. [Deals mostly with Chile].
The following citations represent
a summary of the relevant literature
---- . Pension Reform and the
on the aged produced within the
Individual Capitalisation Pension
last 10 years and are intended to
Scheme Stampede in Latin
complement the articles featured in
America. Hertford, Eng.: Business
this issue of Hemisphere.
School, University of Hertfordshire,
1997. 32 pp.
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---- . Pension Reform in Latin
America. A geing a n d Society, vol.
15, no. 3 (1995), pp. 407-415.
Biblioteca Conjunta
CEPAL/ILPES, CELADE.
Envejecimiento de la poblacion:
bibliografia seleccionada. Santiago
de Chile: Naciones Unidas, 1999.
221 pp. [Presented at the World
Congress of Gerontology in
Adelaide, Australia, 19-22 August
1997].
Bravo, Jorge. Envejecimiento de la
poblacion y sistemas de pensiones
en America Latina. CEPAL
Review/Revista d e la CEPAL, no. 72
(December 2000), pp. 251-257
[Also available online at
http://www.cepal.org/ under
Publications].
CELADE Population and
Development Area. Ageing: Four
Dimensions of a Society for All
Ages. Santiago de Chile: Naciones
Unidas, 1997. 42 pp. [Presented
at the World Congress of
Gerontology held in Adelaide,
Australia, 19-22 August 1997].
Chackiel, Jean. El envejecimiento
de la poblacion latinoamericana:
;hacia una relacion de
dependencia favorable? Santiago
de Chile: CEPAL/CELADE, 2000.
37 pp.
Checkoway, Barry. Empowering
the Elderly: Gerontological
Health Promotion in Latin
America. A geing a n d Society, vol.
14, no. 1 (March 1994), pp. 75-96
[Describes innovative community

N S

initiatives to promote the health
and well-being of Latin America’s
elderly].
Chelala, Cesar A. La salud de los
ancianos. Washington, D.C.: Pan
American Health Organization,
1992. 30 pp. [Also published in
English as Adult Health in the
Americas].
Chesnais, Jean Claude, and Susana
Schkolnik. El proceso de envejec
imiento de la poblacion. Santiago,
Chile: CEPAL/CELADE, 1990.
145 pp.
Conferencia Intergubernamental
Iberoamericana sobre Poh'ticas para
Adultos Mayores y Personas con
Discapacidad (3d : 1993 : Santiago
de Chile). Envejecimiento en
America Latina: implicaciones y
desafios. Santiago de Chile:
Programa Adulto Mayor, Ministerio
de Planificacion y Cooperacion,
1993. 103 pp.
Conferencia Latinoamericana en
Odontogeriatria (1st: 1992 :
Taxco, Mexico). Memorias [de la
conferencia convocada del], 27 al
31 de octubre de 1992, Hacienda
El Chorrillo, Taxco, Gro. Mexico
City: Facultad de Odontologi'a,
Universidad Nacional Autonoma,
1993. 88 pp. [Papers dealing with
dental care for the elderly],
De Vos, Susan. Extended Family
Living Among Older People in
Six Latin American Countries.
Jou rn a l o f Gerontology, vol. 45 (May
1990), pp. 87-94.
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Dulcey, Elisa [et al.], eds.
Envejecimiento: experiencias y
perspectivas. Bogota: Asociacion
Interdisciplinaria de Gerontologfa,
1995. 197 pp. [Papers presented
at the 1995 conference Simposio
AIG sobre Envejecimiento in
Bogota, Colombia],
Encuentro Latinoamericano y
Caribeno sobre las Personas de
Edad: Seminario Tecnico. Santiago
de Chile: CEPAL/CELADE, 2000.
581 pp. [1999 meeting in Santiago,
Chile].
Garay, J. Ageing in Latin
America: Present and Future
Problematic. Geriatrika, vol. 13,
no. 8 (197), pp. 13-15.
Gerontologia y geriatria ‘96=
Gerontology, Geriatrics ‘96: pro
grama, resumenes [de las conferencias convocadas del] 6 al 10 de
mayo de 1996, Palacio de
Convenciones de La Habana,
Cuba. Havana: [s.n.], 1996. 303 pp.
Golbert, Laura, and Susana
Schkolnik. El desafio de la seguridad social: el caso argentino.
Santiago, Chile: Regional
Employment Program for Latin
America and the Caribbean (PREALC), 1989. 83 pp.
Grushka, Carols O. Adult and
Old Age Mortality in Latin
America: Evaluation, Adjustments
and a Debate over a Distinct
Pattern. Thesis-University of
Pennsylvania, 1996.
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Gutierrez Robledo, Luis Miguel.
The Ageing Situation in Latin
America. Im pact o f S cience on
Society, no. 153 (1989), pp. 65-80.
Hermalin, Albert I. Setting the
Research Agenda on Aging in
Latin America: Lessons from Asia.
Ann Arbor, Mich.: Population
Studies Center, University of
Michigan, 1995. 36 pp.
Hernandez Castellon, Raul. El
envejecimiento de la poblacion en
Cuba. 2d ed. Havana:
Centro de Estudios Demograficos,
Universidad de La Habana, 1997.
105 pp.
Hoskins, Dalmer D., Donata
Dobbernack, and Christiane
Kuptsch, eds. Social Security at
the Dawn of the 21st Century:
Issues and New Approaches. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books,
2001. 352 pp. [Includes section
on Latin America].
Interamerican Development Bank.
Protection social para la equidad y
el crecimiento. Washington, D.C.:
IDB, 2000. 247 pp. [Discusses
poverty and aging in Latin
America].
Koop, C. Everett, and Clarence E.
Pearson. Critical Issues in Global
Health. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
2001. 472 pp. [Includes references
to Latin America].
Latino Gerontological Center
Newsletter. New York: 1995-.
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City: Permanent Inter-American
Committee on Social Security,
1995. 140 pp.
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Guatemala].
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Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean. The Elderly in
Latin America: A Strategic Sector
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A merican a n d Caribbean bibliogra
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4th CRI Conference
on Cuban and CubanAmerican Studies
March 6-9, 2002
Held every 18 months, CRI's Cuban and Cuban-American studies con
ferences convene scholars and students from around the world. Panels
cover all areas of intellectual inquiry relevant to an understanding of the
history, economics, politics, culture, society and creative expressions of
Cuba and its diaspora. Since 2002 is the centenary of the establishment
of the Cuban Republic (1902), this era in Cuban history will be a main
focus of the 2002 conference. A series of cultural events will complement
the academic sessions.

To register or fo r more information, contact:
CUBAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
University Park, DM 353
Miami, FL 33199
Tel. (305) 348-199/Fax: (305) 348-3593
E-mail: crinst@fiu.edu
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